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This essay is an attempt to clarify the everyday concept of 
obscenity as it is employed unselfconsciously by ordinary people in 
ordinary situations (outside of law courts). I shall try to explain 
the various things ordinary persons are likely to mean when they 
judge things to be obscene, how they are likely to defend those 
judgments with reasons, what the objects of those judgments are 
likely to be (in our culture) and why those objects are selected, and 
how judgments of obscenity resemble and differ from judgments 
of other kinds, including moral judgments. I undertake this task 
in the conviction that more abstract discussions of obscenity, in 
legal as well as philosophical works, all too frequently suffer from 
the defect that the author no longer remembers exactly what it is 
that he is talking about, and that a few gentle reminders can be 
salutary. Furthermore, the forgotten ordinary concept, as we shall 
see, is surprisingly complicated. 
I. Two apparently conflicting rationales for the prohibition of 
obscenity. To paraphrase a learned judge,t it is much easier to 
recognize obscenity than to say what it is. For a century and a half 
American appellate courts had little occasion to do either, since 
the constitutionality of statutes making obscenity a crime was rarely 
challenged. Until the detailed development of free speech doctrine 
in the period from 1918-1958,2 it was roudnely assumed that "ob-
scenity" was the name of one of those large categories of exceptions 
to the constitutional protection of free expression, along with defa-
mation, incitement to violence, counseling crime, fraudulent adver-
tising, and so on. But as free speech protections were steadily tight-
ened during the period in question, pressure mounted on the courts 
to spell out the obscenity exception with greater clarity and pre-
cision. This in turn led to efforts to formulate the underlying 
rationale for making an exception of obscene expressions in the 
first place. -
From the beginning of these efforts there has been a strange 
divergence of justifications for prohibiting obscenity, stemming in 
tum, perhaps, from the oddly heterogeneous character of the ma-
terials most frequently condemned and prosecuted as obscene. The 
latter include hardly anything not encompassed in the Unholy Trio: 
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Nudity, Sex, and Excretion. The restriction of the term "obscene" 
to appropriately offensive materials of these three kinds is so strik-
ing that the authors of the Model Penal Code were led to define 
obscene material (in part) as that which appeals to a "shameful or 
morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion,''3 One leading ra-
rationale for the obscenity prohibition apparently results from a 
judicial concentration on nudity and sex to the total neglect of 
excretion. The normal person finds (some) sex and nudity alluring. 
Attractive exhibitions, descriptions, or depictions of nude bodies 
and sex acts can cause people to experience agitative palpitations 
accompanied by lustful, lecherous, salacious thoughts and images. 
(It is extraordinary how many ordinary, technical, and slang words 
we have for precisely the same state of mind.) According to some 
traditional moral views, now fortunately out of vogue, the very 
existence of such sexy states of mind is an inherent evil. If a judge 
or legislator makes this judgment and also holds the legitimizing 
principle I have called "legal moralism," namely that the preven-
tion of sin or immorality as such, quite apart from harm, is a valid 
ground for prohibitive legislation, he need search no further for a 
rationale for prohibiting obscenity. 
Very quickly, however, such a person is likely to stumble on a 
related, but distinct, rationale. Not only are sinful thoughts in-
herent evils, he is likely to hold; they also tend to have dreadful 
consequences on the character of the person who harbors them. 
Seductively alluring depictions of sex, according to a traditional 
legal formula, tend to "deprave and corrupt." Sexy and indecent 
thoughts turn the thinker into a sexy and indecent person. Accord-
ing to the legitimizing principle called "moralistic paternalism," it 
is bad (harmful) for a person to have impure thoughts and a de-
praved character whatever he may think about the matter, and the 
state has a right to protect him from his own folly by banning the 
corrupting materials. If a judge or legislator is sufficiently im-
pressed by the allure of sexy materials and the general weakness of 
the flesh, he may even invoke the harm principle to justify prohibi-
tion of obscenity, to prevent his more impressionable neighbors 
from committing rapes and other anti-social sexual acts. 
The rationales based on the aphrodisiac effect of ordinary sex-
ual activity on the normal person are wildly implausible, however, 
when applied to so-called "emetic"" depictions of excretion and 
other sorts of scatological obscenity, or for that matter to normally 
disgusting perversions of sexual activity, for example, buggery, 
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bestiality, and sado-masochism, or to grotesquely unattractive nudes. 
Such materials are also standardly denominated "obscene," yet far 
from being dangerously tempting they are disgusting and revolting 
to the average person. It is in application to these forms of ob-
scenity that the words "filth," "smut," and "dirt" seem most nat· 
ural. To most of us, they are more like rotten fruit than like 
luscious, tempting, forbidden fruit. The most obvious ground for 
prohibiting them, one would think, is the need to prevent offensive 
nuisances to unwilling observers. 
It has proved difficult for the moralist to have it both ways in 
his case against sexual obscenity. One can rest a case on too many 
grounds. Sometimes separate reasons may each be plausible con-
sidered in its own right, but contradictory or otherwise paradoxical 
when considered together, as when one child defends himself from 
the charge of striking another by saying "I didn't hit him and 
besides he hit me first."li Judge Jerome Frank pointed out the diffi· 
culty in his concurring opinion in United States v. Rotlz when that 
case was decided by the Second Circuit Appeals Court in 1956: 
If the argument be sound that the legislature may consti-
tutionally provide punishment for the obscene because, 
antisocially, it arouses sexual desires by making sex attrac-
tive, then it follows that whatever makes sex disgusting is 
socially beneficial-and thus not the subject of valid legis-
lation which punishes the mailing of 'filthy' matter.6 
The implacable opponent of obscenity has only one way out 
of Frank's dilemma. He can treat "alluring" and "disgusting" not 
as contradictory predicates that exhaust all the possibilities between 
them, but rather as mere contraries, that is, mutually exclusive 
alternatives that are not jointly exhaustive. Sex can be discussed or 
depicted in a way which is neither alluring nor repellent, as for 
example in scientific treatises, medical texts, and clinical analyses. 
The opponent of sexual obscenity then could urge that any treat-
ment of sex that makes it especially attractive or repellent to the 
ordinary person should be banned. Alluring descriptions and de-
pictions would be prohibited for the usual moralistic and paternal-
istic reasons (such as they are); repellent descriptions and depic-
tions would be acknowledged to have some value in keeping 
lascivious thoughts and lewd actions at bay, but would be forbidden 
nevertheless because of their overriding disvalue as nuisances caus-
ing such unpleasant "offended states" of mind as disgust and 
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repugnance. Such a position is at least consistent, though it has 
little else to recommend it. 
While Judge Frank overlooked the possibility that treatments 
of sex can be neither alluring nor revolting, Harry Kalven neglected 
the more subtle possibility that treatments of sex can be both al-
luring and revolting: "Since it [obscenity] cannot be both at the 
same time for the same audience, it would be well to have more 
explicit guidance as to which objection controls."7 Kalven here 
misses one of the most important and elusive points about sexual 
obscenity: it can be both alluring and revolting in tlte same re-
spect, at the same time, to the same person. This can happen in 
either of two ways, and here again is an elusive distinction. The 
experience of simultaneous allure and repugnance can be shameful, 
and hence on balance, profoundly offensive, or it can be what is 
called thrilling, and hence in some complex and qualified way, 
pleasurable.& And to further stagger our already overburdened 
conceptual categories, it can be in some proportion or other both 
shameful and thrilling! 
Attraction and disgust are both involved in the complex mech-
anism of shameful embarrassment, the most distinctive mode of 
offensiveness produced by obscenity. Even a prude is vulnerable 
to the charms of sex. He sees; he momentarily experiences lasciv-
ious longings and impure thoughts; he blushes with shame at his 
own impulses. That may end the battle with conscience restored 
to its throne, or it may continue for an extended period with lust 
and shame contending like gladiators. In the most extreme and 
destructive case, the upshot may be prolonged self-hatred, with 
prurience curdled into disgust and loathing. 
Thrill-seeking is quite another matter, equally complex, and 
if anything, more mysterious psychologically. Strange as it may 
seem to the prude, there are those who apparently enjoy the tension 
between allure and disgust, who find its inner turmoil and excite-
ment "thrilling" and actively seek it out, very much as youngsters 
seek out roller-coasters and other exciting rides at amusement parks 
for the thrill of sensations that arc normally alarming and generally 
taken to be disagreeable. The analogy is also close (though not 
perfect) to the thrills of watching horror shows and spooky, scary 
films. (In New York thousands queued up for hours in 1974 for 
the opportunity of being frightened nearly out of their wits by 
the film The Exm·cist, and dozens of these vomited or fainted dur-
ing the showings.)D There is also an <malogy to so-called "tear-
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jerkers" and even to genuine danger and discomfort as from motor-
cycle racing or mountain climbing. Most of these thrills (excepting 
cases of voluntarily incurred genuine danger) function psychologi-
cally as vicarious sublimations of genuine human drives for excit· 
ing activity and adventure, or as substitute objects for the working 
out of genuine emotional problems, while knowledge of one's real 
safety is "temporarily suspended." Similarly, it is exciting to the 
point of thrilling (for some) to be sexually naughty while really 
safe, to indulge one's lascivious thoughts and images and even to 
approach and playfully transgress the limits of imagination imposed 
by the inner censor, when one is no more likely to abandon oneself 
totally than one is likely in the analogous case to fall out of the 
roller-coaster. 
In such ways as these, sexual pictures, films, and literary de-
scriptions may cause and exploit inner tensions, ambivalences, and 
conflicts. Precisely the same materials may cause other viewers 
unalloyed pleasure, and still others may be "left cold," altogether 
unaffected emotionally. Those whose pleasure is unmixed and 
those who are unaffected one way or another are not likely to use 
the word "obscene" to describe what they see, except perhaps with 
"scare-quotes" around the word and the meaning "what is generally 
called obscene." "When the materials are not thought to be truly 
offensive, neither are they thought to be truly obscene (said with 
feeling and without scare-quotes). Therein lies the first clue to the 
analysis of the concept of the obscene. 
2. The analysis of obscenity. Obscene materials then, what-
ever else they may be, are offensive materials. A good start, but it 
doesn't take us far. A full analysis would specify the sorts of objects 
that can be obscene, characterize the mode or modes of offensive-
ness peculiar to the obscene, and tell whom, as well as how, ob-
scenity offends. We can begin with the latter question. One and 
the same item can offend one person and not another; moreover, 
given the great diversity of mankind, there may be hardly anything 
that doesn't offend someone or other. Yet surely the word "obscene" 
will have very little utility if it can both apply and not apply to 
the same thing or if it applies near-universally to everything. A 
better beginning would be to say that "X is obscene" means "X is 
apt to offend almost anyone." This is to interpret "obscene" as 
what P. H. Noweli-Smith has called an "aptness word," one which 
"indicates that an object has certain properties which are apt to 
arouse a certain emotion or range of emotions."to Nowell-Smith 
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contrasted aptness words with purely descriptive words such as 
"red," "square," "tall," and "wet." Not that aptness words can't 
suggest that the objects to which they apply have certain properties, 
at least within a range, but rather that they do more than merely 
"describe" their objects in this limited way. To say that the view 
from a certain location is sublime is perhaps to imply that it is 
extensive and panoramic, but it is also to say, according to Nowell-
Smith, that it is apt to arouse an emotion of awe or a stirring, 
breathtaking reaction, in one (anyone) who experiences it. And to 
say that it is apt to arouse that emotion in anyone is to say that it 
will arouse that emotion in a typical or "average" person in typical 
circumstances. If John Doe experiences the view from that location 
but is unmoved by it, that does not prove that the view is not 
sublime, but only that John Doe is not in certain ways a typical 
observer. Nowell-Smith's list of typical aptness-words includes the 
following: "terrifying, hair-raising, disappointing, disgusting, ri-
diculous, funny, amusing, sublime."ll ("Disappointing" means "apt 
to disappoint"; "disgusting" means "apt to disgust"; "amusing" 
means "apt to amuse"; and so on.) The presence of "disgusting" on 
this list suggests that "obscene" might belong there too. 
Aptness words, as Nowell-Smith conceives them, can be used 
simply to predict the reactions of other people to the objects of 
which they are predicated, with no expression of the speaker's own 
attitude. John Doe in the previous example, if asked to describe 
the view at the location in question, might reply, "It is sublime, 
although I was unmoved by it." But this is artificial and excep-
tional. For the most part, when a speaker uses an aptness word 
he wishes to imply that he himself has the reaction most people are 
apt to have, and further, that that reaction is the appropriate one 
to have in the circumstances. If a person who was in fact bored by 
a book tells you, in response to your query, that it is amusing, he 
may not be exactly lying, but he certainly misleads inexcusably, 
even if in fact the book is apt to amuse you and most other people. 
That is because when he said the book was amusing he implied, 
without exactly saying so, that he himself had been amused by it. 
Nowell-Smith understands this point well: 
In default of other evidence the use of an A-sentence [one 
applying an aptness word] usually implies that the speaker 
has the appropriate reaction. It would be odd to say that 
a book was enlightening or amusing and then go on to say 
that one was not enlightened or amused by it. Odd but 
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not impossible. 'It was a terrifying ordeal but I wasn't 
frightened.' 'It may be very funny but I am not inclined 
to laugh.' . . . . in these cases the 'subjective element' is 
expressly withdrawn; and since these statements are not 
self-contradictory, we cannot say that 'X is terrifying' either 
means or [logically] entails 'I am frightened by X.' Never-
theless, in default of an express withdrawal, we should al-
ways be entitled to infer that the speaker has the appro-
priate reaction.t:l 
In typical usage, however, the speaker does more than imply 
that he has (has had, or would have) the emotion or feeling in 
question; he can be understood, in addition, to be endorsing that 
emotion or feeling as the correct or appropriate reaction in the 
circumstances. When Jones says that X is amusing, in the typical 
case, he can be understood to be (i) asserting that X would amuse 
the average person, (ii) implying (subject to explicit withdrawal) 
that it amuses him as well, and (iii) endorsing amusement as the 
correct or appropriate reaction to X. If there is any doubt about 
his intention to endorse, he can underline it by saying that X is 
"truly" or "really" amusing. The point applies (with occasional 
deviant variations) to tl1e other aptness words such as "frighten-
ing," and "disgusting." This three-pronged analysis (predicting, 
expressing, endorsing) defines what we can call the "standard use" 
of aptness words. 
Language is seldom so simple and rigid a thing, however, as 
to be summarized in such neat formulas, and wherever tltere is a 
standard use, there are likely to be various intelligible non-standard 
uses as well. In particular, aptness-words may sometimes be used 
in a non-endorsing way. A highly disciplined, courageous man 
might admit that certain circumstances are frightening because he 
knows that they are apt to frighten his auditors and other typical 
persons, and yet deny both that they frighten him and that fear 
is a natural, inevitable, or appropriate reaction to them. A moralist 
might concede that certain "ethnic jokes" are amusing while not 
only denying that amusement is the appropriate reaction to them, 
but also urging people not to be amused by them. A nutrition 
expert might admit that eating insects is disgusting, but deny that 
disgust is appropriate given the high protein content of broiled 
grasshoppers. 
Sometimes aptness words are applied so constantly to a given 
class of objects that they acquire almost the force of fixed conven-
tion, so that it would seem perverse and even self-contradictory to 
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deny that they properly apply to those classes. Those who would, 
nevertheless, deny the appropriateness of the conventional response 
in these cases are forced to do it in other ways, while conceding 
that the aptness term applies in a non-endorsing way. To make 
that concession would be to use the aptness term in scare-quotes 
or in an "inverted comma" sense.1a \Vhen an aptness word A is 
applied to some object X in this way it means roughly "what is 
called A by most people, but not necessarily by me." A familiar 
tip-off that a speaker is using A in this non-endorsing fashion is 
his use of the qualifying phrase "so-called," as in "a so-called dirty 
joke," or a "so-called nice girl." Even if he thinks that there is 
nothing dirty about risque anecdotes, he may use the phrase "dirty 
jokes" as a conventional label for them, just as he uses (without 
endorsement of the appropriateness of offense) the conventional 
label "obscene words" for certain impolite epithets. 
Another non-standard use of such words as "amusing," "fright-
ening," and "disgusting" is to keep the endorsing function while 
dropping the predictive element. Normally, this is thought to be 
linguistically odd. If I learn that a situation that amuses me fails 
to amuse others, I will reluctantly admit that it is not really amusing 
while insisting that it amused me anyway. If I am frightened of 
closed doors, I will have to concede that they are not really frighten-
ing; they only frighten me. If I am disgusted by the sight of boiled 
potatoes, I will admit that they are not really disgusting while 
confessing that nevertheless they disgust me. (I may not know 
what is bad, but I know what I dislike.) It would indeed seem odd 
in these cases to insist that amusement, fear, or disgust are appro-
priate reactions while admitting that their objects are not apt to 
cause others to have those feelings. But there are times when we 
have enough self-confidence to stick by our guns and, whether 
"odd" or not, say: "I don't care whether anyone else in the whole 
world is amused (frightened, disgusted) by X, X is truly amusing 
(frightening, disgusting) all the same." When we get to this point 
our convictions are on the line and our arguments and reasons in 
readiness, so that we are not likely to have much patience for 
linguistic quibbles. "I am amused (frightened, disgusted) by X and 
I can present reasons why anyone in my circumstances ought to be 
amused (frightened, disgusted) by it," we might say. "The impor-
tant question is whether X has characteristics that make it worthy 
of, or properly the object of, amusement (fear, disgust), not whether 
linguistic conventions permit the application of the word "amus-
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ing" ("frightening," "disgusting") to it when no one else is apt to 
be amused (frightened, disgusted)." 
A speaker's use of a word in this way to endorse an emotional 
response while wholly unconcerned about the extent to which that 
response is shared, is not so much a "non-standard use of an apt· 
ness word," as the conversion of an aptness word into a word of 
another kind altogether. Nowell-Smith calls such words as "desir-
able," "praiseworthy," and "lamentable," whose whole function is 
to endorse a particular type of response, "gerundive words,''14 since 
they say, in effect, that a given responsive attitude "is to be" felt. 
Sometimes the conversion of an aptness word into a gerundive word 
creates a linguistic strain that is too great to sustain and the result 
is intolerable "oddness." Fortunately, there is usually another 
gerundive word, or endorsing word (as I prefer to call it) at hand 
to relieve the strain and permit the argument to proceed. Am I 
the only one who is amused by X? Very well then, perhaps X is 
not amusing. (I give up the aptness word.) But it is funny anyway, 
and exquisitely and subtly comic. Fully informed and genuinely 
sensitive people will be amused by it, whatever the general run of 
people may think. Am I the only one who is frightened by Y? 
Very well then, perhaps Y is not frightening, but it is objectively 
threatening and dangemus nevertheless, and any sensible prudent 
person will be frightened of it. Am I the only one who is disgusted 
by Z? Very well then, perhaps Z is not disgusting, but whether it 
disgusts others or not, the disgust it arouses in me is fully justified 
and appropriate. Perhaps more useful words for these notions 
would be "amuseworthy," "feanvorthy," and "disgustworthy." They 
would clearly take the strain off the non-standardly used aptness 
words. 
How, if at all, can one person rationally defend his judgment 
that disgust is a "worthy," proper, or appropriate response to some 
object or behavior, and how can one convince another, using ra-
tional means of persuasion, to share his emotional reaction? It may 
be impossible conclusively to support such judgments of appro-
priateness with reasons, just as it is impossible to prove (say) to an 
unamused person that some joke is truly amusing. The only way 
to convince the latter person may be to get him somehow (perhaps 
by reiteration, different inflection, background explanation, or con-
tagious laughter) to share one's amusement. On this model for 
obscenity, the only way to convince a person that X is truly offen-
sive is to get him somehow to share one's own shock or disgust, 
II 
perhaps by exposing him more vividly or thoroughly to X, by pre-
senting X in a different light, by describing X in a new but accurate 
way, by background explanation, or contagious revulsion. These 
methods arc not very similar to those used by mathematicians when 
they state the premises from which theorems follow deductively, 
nor to those used by scientists, historians and lawyers when they 
muster evidence that gives support to their factual claims, nor even 
to those used by moralists when they cite the authority for their 
moral judgments and principles. In contrast to these other modes 
of reason-giving, the methods for supporting judgments of the 
appropriateness of certain feelings (including judgments of dis-
gust-worthiness) are "non-rational." But there need be nothing 
sinister involved in using so-called non-rational methods when the 
"reasons" offered are relevant to the case at hand. Reiteration, 
background explanation, and the contagion of example are surely 
"relevant" in a way in which arm-twisting, threats, and the use of 
drugs or hypnosis are not. And surely there is nothing sinister in 
the use of the best reasons one can find, even when they fall far 
short of rational demonstration. Perhaps that is what Aristotle 
meant when he wrote that in any given branch of discourse, "we 
should not expect more precision than the subject matter, by its 
very nature, admits of."lll 
Usage of terms like "obscene," of course, is far from clear-cul. 
It would be absurd for philosophers to waste time disputing over 
it. But it is possible to characterize in a general way at least some 
of its more important uses. Beyond that, further precision is both 
difficult and unnecessary. The word "obscene" then is commonly 
used either as: 
(i) a standard aptness word, with predictive, expressive, 
and endorsing elements, meaning roughly "disgusting," 
"shocking," or "revolting." 
(ii) a standard gerundive word used only to endorse a certain 
kind of emotional reaction as appropriate, and having 
roughly the meaning that "disgustworthy," "shock-
worthy," or "repugnanceworthy" would have if there 
were such words. 
(iii) a non-standard aptness word used primarily or exclusively 
to predict the response of other people, actual or hypo-
thetical, to the materials or conduct in question. 
(iv) a purely descriptive or classifying term applying a con-
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ventional label with a "so-called" qualification tacitly 
understood, as in the phrase "obscene epithet" or "dirty 
joke." (This fourth use neither predicts, expresses, nor 
endorses any particular response to the materials or con-
duct in question.) 
Our next task is to characterize more exactly the distinctive 
sort of offensiveness peculiar to the obscene conduct and creations 
of human beings. To facilitate this job, I shall draw on an astute 
but little known article by Peter Glassen.16 In this article, Classen 
coins the term "charientic"17 to refer to a class of evaluative judg-
ments which he thinks are quite distinct and different from moral 
and aesthetic 'judgments. Statements ascribing vulgarity are typical 
of the judgments in this category: 
It seems to me that they [charientic judgments] are not 
moral judgments. The things thought to be vulgar-like 
chewing gum, making scenes, picking one's nose, etc.-are 
not commonly thought to be morally wrong or immoral. 
Moreover, a man may be thought to be of the highest 
moral character, and yet be held to be vulgar in greater or 
lesser degree . . . Conduct can be judged from more than 
one perspective at the same time . . . It seems to me to 
be pretty clear also that judgments in terms of 'vulgar' 
are not aesthetic judgments, being made mostly about per-
sons and their acts, and not about things and experiences. 
'Vulgar' applied to works of art is a transferred epithet; 
'beautiful' and 'ugly,' however, are not.JB 
The class of "charientic terms," positive and negative, includes not 
only "vulgar," but "uncouth," "boorish," "tasteless," "philistine," 
"refined," "sensitive," "cultivated," "civilized," and "tasteful." 
These terms as a class clearly seem distinguishable from "righteous," 
"wicked," "honest," and "cruel," and also from "beautiful," "ugly,'' 
"dainty," and "dumpy." 
Classen goes on to distinguish moral from charientic approval; 
the former is akin to respect, the latter closer to admiration. Moral 
disapproval is, among other things, a resentful reaction, leading to 
indignation and settled hostility, whereas charicntic disapproval is 
more akin to contempt, a "looking down one's nose reaction," and 
(when felt at a safe distance where strong personal offense is not 
taken) derision and ridicule. "We want to laugh at the vulgar; 
we want to punish the wicked."19 But vulgarity at close quarters is 
no laughing matter. Its irritations can be severe, even if short of 
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harmfulness, and provoke snarling denunciations rather than de-
risive laughter or snobbish hauteur: 
But sometimes we hear tirades against vulgarity. They 
can have the fervor and virulence of the outraged moralist, 
but they do not express a moral point of view. They pro-
ceed from irritation at having to put up with the unpleas-
antness or frustrations of living in an uncongenial miheu.2o 
The charientic vocabulary runs separately but parallel to the 
moral vocabulary in various other respects too. Since most vul· 
garity is unintentional (done in ignorance) there is no charientic 
counterpart to guilt, Glassen tells us, but we do feel a kind of 
embarrassment analogous to moral shame when we suddenly realize 
that we have committed, however inadvertently, a "charientic faux 
pas."2l Similarly, moral hypocrisy has its counterpart in charientic 
affectation, self-righteousness in snobbishness. People to whom 
charientic virtues are supremely important may refrain from im-
moral conduct not so much because it is immoral as because it is 
vulgar, "beneath them," "cheap," "bad form," or "bush-league." 
Acts of dishonesty, rudeness, cruelty, and the like, are very often 
also crude and gross, not the sorts of things a person of refined 
sensibility or good upbringing would do. Here charientic judg· 
ments reenforce moral ones and apply with equal relevance to 
immoral conduct. Still, the charientic and moral standards, even 
in combination, retain their separate identities. 
Ascriptions of obscenity to persons, their actions, or as "trans· 
(erred epithets" to their creations, are the charientic judgments 
par excellence. That is not to say that judgments of obscenity are 
the most typical or representative charientic judgments, but rather 
that they are charientic judgments of the most extreme kind. Ob-
scenity is the outer limit of vulgarity. To the question "How vul· 
gar can one get?", the answer is "vulgar to the point of obscenity." 
Obscene conduct is not merely in "bad form," ungracious and 
unseemly; it is conduct in the worst possible form, utterly crude, 
coarse, and gross. The adjectives that regularly consort with the 
noun "obscenity" fully reveal its extreme and unqualified char· 
acter: the obscene is pure and unmixed, sheer, crass, bare, unveiled, 
bald, naked, rank, coarse, raw, shocking, blunt, and stark. It hits 
one in the face; it is shoved under one's nose; it shocks the eye. 
The obscene excludes subtlety or indirection, and can never be 
merely veiled, implied, hinted, or suggested. The idea of a "subtle 
obscenity" is a contradiction in terms. 
14 
An obscene person, then, is one whose character or conduct is 
so extremely deficient in the charientic graces as to be downright 
repulsive, a person who is apt to offend anyone, and in response to 
whom offense is an appropriate (or at least an understandable) 
response. The obscene person is coarse-and then some. The 
Webster's Third New Intcmational Dictionary contains a revealing 
discussion of the word "coarse" comparing and contrasting it with 
its near synonyms, among which it includes vulgar, gross, obscene, 
and t•ibald. Coarseness itself when applied to character and conduct 
is a paradigm of a charientic term referring to one who is "crude 
or unrefined in taste, manners, or sensibilities; without cultivation 
of taste, politeness or civility of manner, or delicacy of feeling," 
often "crude and indelicate of language or idea, especially with 
violation of social taboos on language." "Vulgar" is much the 
same in meaning, but is an even stronger term, one which "may 
suggest boorishness." "Gross" is clearly a close relation, but one 
which "stresses crude animal inclinations and lack of refinement." 
"Obscene," of course, "is the strongest of this group in stressing 
impropriety, indecency, or nastiness .... " Finally "ribald" suggests 
"rough merriment or crude humor at the irreverent, scurrilous, or 
vulgar." Ribald behavior, I should think, is merely naughty, 
though perhaps extremely so, but the other terms in this negative 
charientic family apply to the repulsively offensive, and of those, 
"obscene" is by far the strongest, unless we include in this group, 
as Webster's did not, the word "indecent." 
The terms "decent" and "indecent" are more confusing than 
the others we have considered, probably because there are two con-
cepts of decency and indecency, one of which is moral and the 
other charientic. There is no doubt that the charientic sense is 
etymologically prior to the moral one, and that "indecent" does 
belong in the same charientic family that includes "coarse," "gross," 
"vulgar," and "obscene." The positive term "decent" came into 
English no later than I 539 from the Fre.nch decent, which was 
derived in turn from the Latin decere, to be fitting or becoming, 
which is related to the Greek dokein, to seem good (with emphasis 
on the seeming) and the Sanskrit verb for seeking to please, or 
being gracious. It is closely related to such other English words as 
"decor" and "decorate," "decorous" and "indecorous," and "dig-
nity" and "indignation." The Oxford English Dictionary lists 
among its primary senses "becoming, suitable, or proper to the cir-
cumstances ... seemly," and "in accordance with propriety or 
15 
good taste, especially free from immodesty or obscenity." Webster's 
defines it as "fitting in words, behavior, dress, or ceremony, espe-
cially in relation to an accepted standard: decorous, proper, seemly, 
as in 'decent conduct,' or 'decent language.'" Indecency, on the 
other hand, is an "offense against delicacy" or "against decorum.'' 
An indecent act is one that is "unbecoming, unseemly, or indeco-
rous," as, for example, one done in "indecent haste," and indecent 
language is "unfit to be seen or heard, as offensive to modesty and 
delicacy.'' 
The purely charientic concept of indecency that is captured in 
these dictionary definitions applies to offensive or unfitting ways 
of appearing, to "how things look" to observers. Conduct is in-
decent in this sense because it has characteristics that make it ex-
tremely unpleasant to witness. For one reason or another it makes 
observers uncomfortable; it can make them squirm with embar-
rassment. The wholly charientic sort of indecency has such effects 
on us even when we have no objection in principle to the category 
of behavior it exemplifies. There are many kinds of charientically 
indecent conduct that are not inherently immoral by any one's 
standards and would be utterly unobjectionable if done unobserved, 
in private. H. L. A. Hart cites sexual intercourse performed in 
public by a married couple as behavior that is indecent (in its 
context) but not immoral, since it would be wholly innocent if 
done in private.22 More subtle examples concern areas of life that 
have nothing to do with sex. Indeed any conspicuous display of 
behavior that makes observers uncomfortable, any bold flaunting 
of tastelessness, can appear "indecent" in the purely charientic 
sense. Robertson Davies in his novel Fifth Bttsiness uses the word 
"indecent" to describe the behavior of an overly ardent clergyman 
who embarrasses his congregation with excessive public displays of 
piety, though hardly any amount of religious ardor in private could 
be "excessive" in one who has chosen the religious vocation: 
A few of his flock said that he walked very closely with 
God, and it made him spooky. We had family prayers 
at home, a respectful salute to Providence before breakfast, 
enough for anybody. But he was likely to drop on his 
knees at any time and pray with a fervor that seemed in-
decent. Because I was often around their house, I some-
times stumbled in on one of these occasions, and he would 
motion me to kneel with him until he was finished-which 
could be as long as ten or fifteen minutes later.2a 
16 
A second class of examples portray conduct that is "indecent" 
in a hybrid sense, partly charientic and partly moral. Such conduct 
offends observers not because it is the sort of activity that is gen-
erally unpleasant to observe, but rather because it is thought to be 
unfitting to the special circumstances in which the actor finds him-
self. The offense is partly moral because it betrays attitudes in 
the actor that the observer finds morally inappropriate, and the 
very existence of the attitudes is an affront to moral sensibility. 
But the offense is also partly charientic because the objectionable 
attitudes, when publicly flaunted, are symbolic gestures of disre-
spect and therefore unseemly, unbecoming, indecorous. A motley 
of examples involving "indecent haste" illustrate well this hybrid 
class. There is nothing inherently immoral in attending a joyous 
songfest in a tavern, but it is unbecoming (at the very least) when 
done in indecent haste after the funeral of one's parent or closest 
friend. And there is nothing immoral as such in seeking to court 
a lady, but it is unseemly (at the very least) when done in indecent 
haste after the death of her husband or of one's own wife. The 
disrespectful attitudes manifested in these examples may or may not 
be morally objectionable, but when they are morally flawed they 
are so whether publicly exhibited or not. In these cases, however, 
their display in the circumstances adds a new dimension of offen-
siveness to them. We are made acutely uncomfortable by the naked 
exhibition of private feelings and moral flaws which (like their 
physical analogues) are best kept out of public view. It is bad 
enough to be morally objectionable in a certain way, but it is 
wrong on an additional ground to let oneself appear as one in fact 
is. It is extremely bad taste to flaunt one's moral flaws. And in 
the examples above, the revelation of the flaws is itself an insult 
to the memory of the departed. 
Indecency of the third, or purely moral kind is a very special 
way of being immoral whether one's objectionable behavior occurs 
in public or in private. The Victorian husband who always keeps 
up appearances in public but bullies his helpless wife mercilessly 
in the privacy of their home is not a "decent fellow." His cruelty is 
so beastly it is "positively indecent," as we say, whether or not 
there are observers to be offended by it. If he loses control of his 
temper at a public function and shamelessly humiliates his wife in 
full view of her friends and associates, then his behavior is indecent 
in both senses: shamelessly immoral and tastelessly exhibited. It is 
only in the latter instance that it is obscene, for in the private case 
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there are no observers to be disgusted. When it does offend it does 
so by being a blatant violation of the observer's moral principles, a 
shock to his moral sensibility, not merely an affront to his senses, 
his taste, or his dignity, as the sight of a person defecating, for 
example, might be. 
A "thoroughly decent man," in the wholly moral sense, is not 
simply a person who refrains from unseemly or indecorous public 
behavior. 1£ that is all the phrase meant it would be faint praise 
indeed. Rather it is a person of unquestioned integrity and recti-
tude. It is this same, familiar, wholly moral sense that explains why 
we sometimes "appeal to a person's decency" when we implore him 
to help someone in serious need. "In all decency," we may ourselves 
say, "I could not stand by and watch him suffer." This use has 
nothing to do with charientic graces, no more than being good (in 
the most basic and important ways) has to do with merely seeming 
good, or more to the point, with merely not seeming outrageously 
bad. 
3. The genesis of obscenity. Extremely coarse and indecent 
acts are models of obscenity, but they are certainly not the only 
things, and possibly not even the original sorts of things to which 
the word has been applied. Etymologically the word is said to 
derive from the Latin ob (to, before, against) plus caenum (filth). 
Presumably, the Romans used a similar term in their language 
to mean "of or pertaining to filth." The word is still applied in 
English to natural objects that may in no way be the product of 
human design. Anything in nature that is rank and raw is likely 
to strike us as obscene. We think of both natural objects and hu-
man wastes as obscene when we think of them as filthy, foul, slimy, 
snotty, and generally loathsome to the senses. One of the standard 
uses of the word is to refer to things that are "obscene to the 
touch." Webster's quotes an unnamed writer who reports that 
"obscene fungi clothed the wall of that dank cavern." An "un-
naturally" dank and musty toadstool is hardly surpassed in ob-
scenity unless by a wriggly slug in the black mud under a rock. 
Obscene objects send shudders up our spines and set our teeth 
on edge.24 
It is not unlikely that the psychological origin of the idea of 
the obscene (quite apart from the derivation of the word) is lo-
cated in what may be called the "Yuk reaction" implanted in 
children by their parents in the crawling stage of infancy. Imagine 
a typical scene in a city park on a spring day. Mother watches from 
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a bench as her child reels or crawls on the grass. Soon an object 
catches the infant's eye. He moves into its range and by a sudden 
instinctive motion the object is in his hand, and the hand is moving 
towards his mouth. The object might be a discarded cigarette 
package, a thoroughly used wad of chewing gum, a bit of dried 
animal dung, some unidentifiable slimy thing, a worm, or an ice 
cream carton with an oozy residue compounded of melted choco-
late, saliva, and mud. The mother, of course, springs to her feet 
in horror. "No, no!" she cries; "Dirty! Nasty! YUKI" These and 
similar admonitory locutions are uttered with the expression of 
one who is so ill she is about to regurgitate, and a characteristic 
tone and inflection that marks this type of prohibition off from 
various other kinds. Eating strange objects is not morally wrong 
like eating brother's candy; it is not selfish, mean, unfair, or cruel. 
It is simply (what better word is there?) YUKY. 
The child usually learns his lessons all too well. The grasping-
tasting reflex is brought under control soon enough, but is then 
followed by a period of excessive fastidiousness (common between 
the ages of seven and twelve but extending even into adulthood 
among the neurotically childish) during which the child distrusts 
all strange dishes and reacts to the likes of an unfamiliar Lobster 
Newburg or Moules Marinieres (no doubt imitating mother's orig-
inal manner) with an emphatic "Yuki" or a disdainful "How gross!" 
From then on, education of the tastes is an uphill struggle. 
There is little doubt that the yuk reaction serves the cause of 
hygiene and health, even of infant survival. It is apparently a 
learned reaction for the most part, the infant learning to control 
his instinctive movements by negative reenforcement. But some 
repugnances are close to universal even among small children, and 
it is possible that some of these have an instinctive basis. Desmond 
Morris has suggested, for example, that aversion to snakes, beetles, 
and small crawly things might be instinctive,llll Inherited aversive 
responses of that kind might well have had strong survival value 
leading to their preservation by evolutionary processes, much in 
the manner of feline "nervousness," or the constant head move-
ments and general skit~ishness of birds. In any case, learned or not, 
there is no doubting their utility, within limits, to the species. 
Yuk reactions to things perceived as dirty, gross, or unnaturally 
strange, whether learned or inherited, are natural and universal 
phenomena. The sorts of things that can trigger the reaction, of 
course, vary widely among mankind, with varying conceptions of 
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what is filthy, or strange, or "yuky." And various alternative reac-
tions are possible even to acknowledged dirt, starkness, or rawness. 
Consider such objects as vivid, close-up, highly magnified, color pho-
tographs of male and female sex organs in a state of full engorge-
ment and excitation. A person might have any one (or some com-
bination} of four purposes in peering at these unnaturally abstract 
and depersonalized objects, and with each purpose goes a char-
acteristic attitude of response. The first of these is the reaction 
almost anyone would be apt to have if caught off guard and sud-
denly confronted with the photographs, or their images projected 
on to a large screen, namely, a spontaneous shrinking away. The 
enlarged technicolored organs are "too much!" Too much even of 
a good thing is coarse and sickening. The second reaction might be 
that of a diagnostic physician or a medical student: detached, ob-
jective, scientific. Looking at vulvas or penises in that spirit is like 
looking at any other organ, healthy or diseased, or like looking at 
an X-ray picture. The third possible reaction is one which would 
tend to be inhibited by either of the first two, but which might 
emerge nevertheless, and coexist to some degree or another with 
the others. That would be to find the pictures strangely moving 
despite their surface repulsion, and to feel the first internal rum-
blings of a "genital commotion." The detailed enlargements might 
make the objects a bit too stark and coarse for full comfort, but the 
thought that what one is looking at is, after all, somebody's sex 
organ, might yet be unsettling and lust-inducing. Obscenity, in 
this case, is a barrier to prurience which must be overcome, and not 
itself a direct inducement. A fourth possible (but not very likely) 
reaction would be openly to revel in the coarseness of the pictures, 
to see them as yuky and yet to wallow in them in full and public 
abandonment. 
To which of our hypothetical observers will the pictures seem 
obscene7 Clearly they will be thought and experienced as obscene 
by the first observer, and clearly not by the second. The ambivalent 
reaction of the third observer, in which repugnance is overlaid with 
or even overcome by lust, is no doubt what many judges and moral-
ists have thought to be the very model of obscenity, but it is better 
analyzed as a mixed case, in which the bald and coarse elements 
properly called obscene fail to suppress an attraction that teases 
and goads withal. The fourth case raises special conceptual prob-
lems that will be dealt with below. The open reveler clearly does 
not regard the pictures as obscene. His is not a yuk reaction. But 
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another party who takes in the whole scene that includes (say) the 
pictures projected on a screen and the lewd and open reveling in 
them by the observer, is likely to regard the composite spectacle as 
obscene, just as he might similarly react to a person's joyous revel-
ing at the death of an enemy at the latter's funeral. In both cases, 
a second party might locate the obscenity not in the stimulus (the 
pictures, the death) but in a grossly inappropriate response to it. 
In a similar way, a Moslem or an orthodox Jew might not think 
that the bare existence of a roast of pork is obscene, but he may 
behold a coreligionist savoring every bite o£ the forbidden food, 
and take that respome to the roast pork to be obscene. 
Tabooed behavior and other conduct grossly violative of an 
observer's "higher order sensibilities" mark a third category of 
obscenity, to go with things that are directly offensive to the senses 
and to the "lower order sensibilities." Almost anyone is apt to be 
offended by the odd and alien appearance of creatures who look 
as if covered with mucus, phlegm, or congealed wound products all 
of which are loosely associated with the unhealthy, the dirty, the 
excretal. These objects may directly offend the senses, or they may 
be seen as (say) slugs and therefore disgusting. But the roast pork 
example shows that objects and activities can also be seen as 
tabooed and therefore disgusting, and extreme instances of this 
sort too are called "obscene." Moreover, examples of so-called in-
decencies show that gross and naked violations of moral principle 
(e.g. an observed act of torturing a prisoner) are also disgusting 
to the point of obscenity.2a 
4. The scope of the obscene: clues in extended applications. 
Instances of crassly repugnant violations of standards of appropriate 
and decent conduct, or o£ violations of ideals and principles, are 
likely to include a large diversity of things other than, or in addi-
tion to, the sexual and scatological. It may well be true that the 
word "obscene" gets stretched in its application to some of these 
things. To those who follow the Model Penal Code definition that 
restricts obscenity to offensive treatments o£ Sex, Nudity, or Excre-
tion, other uses of the word may seem secondary and derivative, 
or even metaphorical. No discussion of obscenity can be complete, 
however, which fails to examine some o£ these "extended applica-
tions," for they are common, dear, and unpuzzling uses of the 
English language, and they present dues to what is essential and 
easily overlooked in the core meaning of "obscene." All are based 
on analogies to something central in the primary applications of 
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the word (to yuky natural objects and coarse behavior and created 
objects.) It will be especially useful to examine specimens of non-
sexual and non-scatological uses if we are to find a hidden key to 
an essential element of the word's meaning that it possesses even 
when it is applied in more familiar ways. Consider then the follow-
ing ten sentences: 
I. "Death under the stars is somehow obscene."27 
2. "The machine gunning of Bonnie and Clyde in the cli-
mactic scene of the film may have been morally and dra-
matically justified, but the blood spurting out of the bullet 
holes as bullets splattered the bodies was a naturally re-
volting sight-so offensive and shocking to the senses as 
to be obscene." 
S. "Nothing is more obscene than a public beheading." 
4. ". . • the obscene little counter-demonstrations lewdly 
exulting in the forthcoming deaths."2S 
5. "'We couldn't have Buddhist bonzes [monks] burning 
themselves on street comers and Madame Nhu [sister-in-
law of Mr. Diem] making obscene comments about bonze 
barbecues,' Mr. Ball said. 'The coup was inevitable.' "2D 
6. "In such cases the sufferer may be reduced to an obscene 
parody of a human being, a lump of suffering flesh eased 
only by intervals of drugged stupor."ao 
7. "The portrait of Dorian Grey was unveiled in all its ob-
scene horror in the technicolored climax of the film." 
8. "The debate ... was almost obscene in its irresponsibil-
ity. "31 
9. "It would seem that Mr. Kraft's premise dictates that the 
primary effort of the United States should be to control its 
private oil firms so that they begin to operate in the na-
tion's interest instead of continuing their present tactics 
of reaping obscene profits while unemployment gains and 
the domestic economy crumbles.''32 
10. " 'Nigger' is the most obscene word in the English lan-
guage."aa 
The first five examples all have to do with death, a subject so 
liable to obscene treatment, it is a wonder that it has not broken 
into the Model Penal Code's Unholy Trio, or at least enlarged it 
into a quartet. To speak in the bluntest terms of sexual intercourse 
in the company of young ladies was once thought to be the clearest 
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case of obscene conduct, but in this day and age it is probably 
thought by most to be no more obscene than to speak of death 
agonies to ali audience of octogenarians, and especially to use such 
crass terms as "croak," "carcass," and "corpse," or to refer to a 
cemetery as a "bone orchard." Death is now one of the last un-
mentionable subjects, at least in the company of the ill and aged. 
And think how uncomfortable we are all made when a very old 
person speaks in an open way of his own impending death. Fur-
thermore, there is nothing more obscene in a perfectly literal, hard-
core sense, nothing from which we naturally shrink with greater 
disgust and horror, than a close-up view of a dead human body 
with its protruding eyes and greenish skin. Nor is there any more 
obscene conduct imaginable than patently inappropriate responses 
to a dead body-desecration, savage dismemberment, brutal ges-
tures, cannibalism, or necrophiliac embraces. 
The first example in the list is perhaps the hardest to interpret 
out of context. Very likely, the author thinks of the death of an 
old or ill person in his own bed or in a sickroom as the paradigm 
of a proper demise, as natural as birth, or growth, or decay, and 
not to be lamented. To be out in the open air under a starry sky, 
on the other hand, is the proper province of the young and healthy, 
the active or the pensive, lovers, loners, and dreamers. When a 
young man, therefore, is shot down "under the stars," the spectacle 
seems unnatural and "inappropriate" and hence more repellant 
than death in more normal circumstances. 
The death scene in the film Bonnie aud Clyde employed new 
cinematic techniques, later widely imitated, for simulating the 
impact of lethal objects on human bodies in the most startlingly 
realistic way. The effect of this shocking dose-up realism, in con-
trast to the happy-go-lucky pace of everything that preceded it in 
the film, is to shock the viewer in an almost intolerably forceful 
way and bring home the message of retribution with maximal dra-
matic impact. Rather than impede the dramatic purposes of the 
film, this utterly revolting scene enhanced them, showing that even 
emetic obscenity can have its aesthetic uses. For the most part, 
however, an excess of blood and guts tends to distract and over-
whelm the viewer and thus weaken the impact of the play. Have-
lock Ellis may have been mistaken on etymological grounds, but he 
was psychologically insightful nevertheless when he suggested that 
the obscene is what must be kept "off stage" and only referred to 
or symbolized on the stage (like the blinding of Oedipus).s" 
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To any cultivated and moderately unworldly or hypocritical 
Englishman at the time of the French Revolution, surely nothing 
was more obscene than the mass public beheadings of The Terror. 
And indeed public beheadings were paradigmatic obscenities, being 
blatantly offensive on several distinct grounds. First, the decapi· 
tated bodies and severed heads were obscene objects par excellence. 
Second, the act of beheading is such a gross and blatant violation 
of the ideal of humanity, so stark and open and defiant a breach 
of moral principle as to be an obscene act. Third, the performance 
of an obscene act before an audience is so grossly repugnant to what 
is appropriate, so gratuitously violative of the dignity and privacy 
of the victim, as to add still another dimension of obscenity to what 
is already richly obscene in its own right.a11 Finally, the blood lust 
manifested in the "obscene" shrieks of joy from the revolutionary 
mobs as heads fell into the bucket was so manifestly inappropriate 
a response to the primary event as to sicken a squeamish observer 
all by itself. The presence of an audience itself makes the spectacle 
obscene. The responses of that audience make it doubly so. 
One can imagine easily enough a context for the fourth speci-
men in the list. We can think of demonstrators picketing in front 
of a darkened prison, or standing in prayerful vigil on behalf of 
doomed political prisoners, the Rosenbergs say, or Sacco and Van-
zetti. Across the street a raucous group of benighted counter-
demonstrators carries placards urging that the loathsome traitors 
be given the hangings they deserve, or claiming that hanging is 
too good a death for the bastards. Reluctant or righteous advocacy 
of the death penalty is a perfectly civilized and dignified posture; 
hatred and blood lust, poorly disguised though indirectly conveyed, 
is another thing, disgusting perhaps, but not yet obscene. Raw 
unveiled blood-lust, on the other hand, loudly and proudly ex-
pressed without subtlety or innuendo, is as obscene as a manifested 
emotion can be. (Unless the cold supercilious barbarism of Mad-
ame Nhu's attitude towards the self-sacrificing monks in specimen 
number five counts as an "emotion.") 
A "lump of suffering flesh" that used to be a fully dignified 
human being is a sight from which all but the most hardened 
among us would recoil in horror. Such a "person" is a revolting 
object from which our senses shrink, but it is also a degraded 
human being, deprived of hope, privacy, dignity, even self aware-
ness. A rotting fruit offends our senses; a hopelessly decayed human 
being breaks our heart as well. The "parodying of humanity" is 
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what is grossly repugnant to our sense of appropriateness, and ob-
scene in its revolting horror. 
The portrait of Dorian Grey has certain similarities to the 
previous example, but some interesting differences as well. The 
picture, of course, is hideously ugly. We recognize it (just barely) 
as a man's face covered with scabs, running sores, broken teeth, 
bloody eyes, and a grotesque and inhuman expression. It does not 
merely offend our senses (although it may do that too). Rather it 
strikes us as obscene because we recognize it as the sort of object 
it is, a parody of a human face. 
It would seem to follow that any actual human being who is 
grotesquely malformed or ugly must appear obscene to those who 
observe him. I see no way of avoiding this conclusion. A grossly, 
hideously ugly body is an obscene sight in the same way and in 
the same sense that a slimy slug or a cavern fungus is. But this 
consequence of our analysis has no unwelcome moral implications. 
A person, after all, is more than his body or his face, and the 
obscenely ugly and deformed can have as many virtues of character 
and intellect, and catainly do have the same human rights, as any-
one else. 
It does not follow from our treatment of this example, more-
over, that obscenity is an "aesthetic category," even on the assump-
tion that ugliness itself is an aesthetic category. The judgment that 
a given work of art is extremely ugly is an aesthetic judgment, 
though of course it is not by itself the expression of an overall 
appraisal. (A painting can be ugly even to the point of obscenity 
and yet full of aesthetic merit on balance.) Extreme ugliness, con-
ceived as a "positive" aesthetic flaw, can spontaneously offend the 
eye and the sensibilities too, and when it is sufficiently barefaced 
and stark, it is obscene. But the judgment that the painting is 
obscene is not itself an aesthetic judgment in the way the judgment 
of ugliness is, nor is the yuk reaction elicited by obscene objects 
itself an "aesthetic response." A badly decorated room with clashing 
colors, mismatched pieces of furniture, and inharmonious and clut-
tered designs, may be judged ugly by the discerning decorator, 
rightly confident of his professional judgment. Its arrangements 
conspicuously fail to satisfy certain conventional criteria, and unless 
some further effect (e.g. amusing campiness) has been deliberately 
attempted and successfully achieved by means of the contrived 
ugliness, the overall aesthetic evaluation will be decisively negative 
too. But if the furniture is all ripped and torn, the wall paper 
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stained, the room covered with dust and littered with debris, so 
that the ugliness is accentuated to the "point of obscenity," the 
resultant judgment of "yukworthiness" will not be a further critical 
judgment of an aesthetic sort. 
When we call faces ugly, we may mean that they fail to satisfy 
certain conventional criteria of form and "composition," in which 
case we make a kind of "negative aesthetic judgment" about th~m. 
"The eyes are too small, the nose too long, the lips too full," we 
might add, thus giving an account of the way the face fails to 
succeed aesthetically. We might still find the homely face as ani-
mated by the spirit of its owner pleasant enough to behold, even if 
deficient when considered as an aesthetic object merely. But if the 
facial features are so grossly deformed as actually to hurt the 
eye, and cause involuntary shrinking and disgust, we are attributing 
no further aesthetic property to them when we say so. Rather we 
have left the realm of the aesthetic altogether for the sphere of the 
disgusting, the revolting, and (in extremis) the obscene. 
Attempted works of art that fail on aesthetic grounds so often 
manifest nonaesthetic Oaws also, that it is easy to confuse the two 
types of defect. In particular, the work is likely to manifest moral 
or charientic flaws of its creator, so that they are attributable to the 
work itself only as "transferred epithets." "Obscene" when it is 
applied in this way to an art object attributes extreme vulgarity 
to the artist rather than an aesthetic flaw to his creation, though 
in all likelihood, such aesthetic defect will also be present. There 
may be some special cases where the work of art (or literature or 
drama) fails not because of the presence of an aesthetic "bad-making 
characteristic," but rather because of the absence of aesthetic "good-
making characteristics," and in these cases it will be easy to confuse 
the artist's moral or charientic flaws with aesthetic bad-making 
characteristics present in the created work, especially when those 
flaws are strong enough to produce a reaction of repugnance. Re-
vulsion, however, is characteristically either moral, charientic, or 
yuky. It may well be, in fact, that there is no such thing as pure 
"aesthetic revulsion," properly speaking, that by the time an emo-
tional reaction is strong enough to be revulsion it has imported 
elements from these other realms. as 
In those infrequent cases when we condemn a work of art as 
an aesthetic failure even though we can identify no positive feature 
of the work that is a peculiarly aesthetic flaw, the aesthetic failing 
is a result of the absence of aesthetic virtues rather than the presence 
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of transferred nonaesthetic flaws. A work of art either succeeds or 
it fails. When it succeeds it will manifest "beauty" or, more likely, 
some other aesthetic virtue; if it does not succeed, it will fail to 
achieve such positive effects, and its aesthetic value, therefore, will 
be nil. In that case it may simply fail to move us one way or the 
other. We will shrug our shoulders and say it leaves us cold, and 
so far as the aesthetic dimension of our experience is concerned 
that is an end to the matter. Such works of art will either have 
positive aesthetic value or they will have no aesthetic value, but 
they do not appear to have peculiarly aesthetic negative value (un-
less that phrase is used simply to refer to the absence o£ positive 
aesthetic merits). There may, of course, be negative elements in 
our experience, but these will not be, properly speaking, aesthetic 
elements. The work might, for example, be trite, hackneyed, ex-
ploitative, imitative, cheap, or vulgar, and these features might 
bore, anger, even disgust us. But the offense we take, in these cases, 
is better understood as moral or charientic than as aesthetic revul-
sion. Our negative aesthetic judgment will be, simply, "it did not 
work." When we add that it was a phony, cynical, inept, unserious 
work as well, we are passing a kind of moral judgment on its 
creator, just as to say that it is vulgar and trite is to make a char-
ientic judgment about its creator. If the work also has features 
(such as intense ugliness) that trigger the yuk reaction, then in 
giving voice to that reaction, we are no more expressing an aesthetic 
judgment than if we gave full vent to our nausea itself while blam-
ing our revulsion on the object which was its occasion.87 
The final three examples in the list of quotations are rather 
pure cases of the type of obscenity that derives from the blatant 
violation of moral principles, and thus from shock to the moral 
sensibilities of one who embraces those principles and beholds their 
naked transgression. An irresponsible congressional or parliamen-
tary debate is an open, public thing. One can sit in the galleries 
and observe with one's own eyes and ears undisguised cynicism, bold 
lies, the bartering of principle for cheap political gain. One might 
react with anger or disappointment if one read an expose of subtly 
concealed corruption "off-stage," but when one sees unveiled and 
undenied surrender of principle for tarnished political reward 
right in the public arena, then the very nakedness of the moral 
offensiveness is "almost obscene." Similarly when an industry's 
"gross and bloated" profits in a period of general economic hardship 
violates one's sense of justice in the most direct and unvarnished 
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way, consisting of a patently arbitrary inequality in the distribu-
tion of social burdens and benefits, the effect on one's sensibility 
again is similar in its impact to a rude blow to the solar plexus. 
Again, there is nothing subtle about obscenity either in its paradig-
matic or its (possibly) extended senses. 
Finally, the word "nigger" is as blunt and directly insulting a 
term of contemptuous abuse as there is in the whole vocabulary 
of the English language. It is not apt to offend everybody, but it 
surely ought to offend everyone, and at least as much as any other 
single word does. To call it obscene then is to use the word "ob-
scene" in its purely gerundive sense (wholly to endorse revulsion 
as an appropriate response to it) rather than in its partly predictive 
sense as a standard aptness word. 
5. An alternative account of obscenity: The view of D.A.]. 
Richards. This account of the scope of obscenity differs from that 
given by David A.J. Richards in his analysis of obscenity which in 
other respects is probably the most adequate account of the subject 
yet propounded.ss Richards's account is similar to the present one 
in emphasizing the offense-endorsement character of judgments of 
obscenity and in leaving it an open question, not to be settled 
immediately by definition, whether any particular class of objects, 
actions, or depictions are "really obscene." But when Richards 
surveys the classes of entities generally agreed to be obscene, he 
extracts from them a relatively narrow common character that 
would exclude most of the items in our list of "extended uses." 
It is clear, I think, that Richards would treat talk of obscene profits, 
obscene debates, obscene ways of dying, obscene punishments, ob-
scene pictures of wounds, obscene exultations in another's death, 
obscene parodies of human beings, and the like, as mere colorful 
metaphors of no particular theoretical significance. 
Richards identifies the concept of the obscene with that of the 
"abuse of bodily function."30 The conceptual complex from which 
the notion of the obscene derives, according to Richards, is that 
which attributes to all the various bodily parts and organs under 
voluntary control "sharply defined functions and ends,"to in the 
same sense as that in which knives and forks, for example, have 
their natural purposes and uses. The purpose of a knife is to cut; 
it is an unnatural "abuse" of a knife, therefore, to pick one's teeth, 
or to stick it in one's ear. Similarly, according to an ancient tra-
dition, "failure to [properly] exercise bodily function is unclean, 
polluting, an abomination, in short, obscene."41 
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The obscene, thus, is a conceptual residuum of very an-
cient ways of thinking about human conduct. . . . Ob-
scenity within this view is a kind of vice, a wasting and 
abuse of the natural employment of bodily functions. 
Hence, a culture's definition of the obscene will indicate 
those areas of bodily function in which the culture cen-
trally invests its self-esteem and in which deviance pro-
vokes the deepest anxieties. For example, incompetence 
with respect to excretory function typically defines the 
frailest members of society, infants and the senile ... 42 
Richards differs from current spokesmen for the traditions 
that generated our Western concept of obscenity not in his analysis 
of that concept but in his application of it. Older moralists took 
masturbation, for example, to be the very model of an unnatural 
abuse of bodily function and therefore obscene and disgusting. 
Richards, on the other hand, has less restrictive and rigid concep-
tions of what bodily parts, especially sexual parts, are for. Part of 
their function at least, on his view, is to give harmless pleasure. 
He finds nothing at all "unnatural," then, in voluntary sexual acts 
of virtually all descriptions. He is not altogether beyond the 
moulding inftuence of his culture, however, as he is the first to 
admit. Thus, while he suggests that sexual pornography does not 
seem obscene to him, coprophagy (eating feces) and eating vomit, 
are quite another story, these being plain abuses of the ingestive 
function.43 
Richards's analysis has the substantial merit of leaving the 
obscenity of any specific type of conduct an open question to be 
settled not by definition but by argument over the appropriateness 
of disgust. Disagreements are interpreted as derived from differing 
conceptions of the natural and proper functions of bodily parts and 
systems. His account also has the merit of emphasizing the con-
nection between the idea of the obscene and the idea of the impure 
and filthy, though perhaps he fails to appreciate sufficiently that 
some yuk reactions are antecedent to, or independent of, religious 
taboos and metaphysical-theological doctrines. Richards's claim, 
however, that "abuse of bodily function" is the tacit criterion to 
which we all appeal in applying the concept of the obscene win 
not withstand close scrutiny, for as a criterion it is doubly deficient, 
being at once too broad and too narrow. 
Richards's criterion is too broad because it would require that 
some actions be classified by some people as obscene, whereas in 
fact, those actions would not be so classified. The official Roman 
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Catholic condemnation of contraception, as I understand it, rests 
on a doctrine, similar to that described by Richards, that bodily 
systems have "sharply defined functions and ends." According to 
the Church, it is an unnatural abuse of the function of the repro-
ductive system to have sexual intercourse while using mechanical 
or chemical devices to prevent conception. For that reason, arti-
ficial contraception is said to be wrong, immoral, and sinful, but 
to my knowledge, no churchman would call it "obscene" on those 
grounds, at least with any pretense at precise judgment as opposed 
to rhetorical emoting. Obscenity, whatever else it involves, is an 
aspect of the way things appear. A married couple making love 
in the privacy of their own bedroom while using contraceptives 
that would be hidden even from the view of an electronic peeping 
Tom, are surely not behaving obscenely, whatever the moral qual-
ity of their conduct. Only when the offensive aspect of behavior is 
blatantly obtrusive is it ever considered "obscene." To take one 
other example of a similar but nonsexual kind, consider smoking. 
To the enemies of that messy and unhygienic practice, it would 
seem at least as unnatural a use of the respiratory system as onanism 
is of the reproductive organs, and almost as unnatural an abuse 
of the lungs as coprophagy is of the digestive tract. Yet, as far as 
I know, no one has thought to condemn cigarette smoking as 
"obscene"-imprudent, reckless, thoughtless, even immoral, but no 
matter how egregiously and publicly offensive, never obscene. 
Richards varies the terms in which he formulates the ground 
of obscenity, and in one of its formulations it states a criterion 
which is too broad in still another fashion. One of his favorite 
ways of stating the matter links obscene acts with the shame one 
feels when one fails to exercise bodily capacities competently (his 
word) "as dictated by standards in which one has invested self-
esteem. "44 Richards's alternate formulations thus mix the distinct 
ideas of "competent performance" and "natural usc and function" 
in a most confusing way. To use a knife to pick one's teeth is an 
unnatural use (or abuse) of a knife: to use a knife to cut, but 
then to cut roughly, unevenly, untidily, may be to use a knife in 
its natural and proper function, but to use it badly or (even) 
incompetently, and a would-be craftsman who has invested self-
esteem in his work, will feel shame as a result. But there is nothing 
obscene in poor workmanship. Richards's criterion put in terms of 
"competent exercise of a capacity" would require the classification 
of private sexual failures-frigidity, impotence, premature ejacula-
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tion-as obscene and thus group them with such things as (say) 
acts o£ coitus performed publicly with animals. 
Richards's statement (or stacements) of the criteria actually 
used to determine obscenity is also too narrow since it leads to the 
exclusion from the category of the obscene acts and objects that 
are commonly and noncontroversially described as "obscene": slimy 
things that are "obscene to the touch," "nauseatingly inhuman" 
looking things, "bleached, obscene, nocturnal Things," "obscene 
parodies of men," "suffering lumps of flesh," rotting corpses, in-
appropriate deaths, inappropriate response to deaths, inappropriate 
discussions of death, obscene spectacles, bloated profits, utterly 
shameless irresponsibility, blatantly unfair inequalities, public tor-
tures of victims before reveling sadistic audiences, and more. Some 
(but not all) of these uses of the word "obscene" may be extended 
beyond standard paradigms of usage, but if so, they have become 
fixed metaphors and not mere colorful but inaccurate idioms. 
They all point by analogy to something essential in the central uses 
of the term, and what they point to is something other than the 
unnatural abuse, or incompetent misuse, of bodily functions and 
capacities. 
6. Summary: general characteristics of obscenity. It is time 
now to summarize our analysis of the concept of obscenity. Accord-
ing to the foregoing account: 
i. Obscenity is an extreme form of offensiveness producing 
repugnance, shock, or disgust, though the offending materials can 
(paradoxically) be to some degree alluring at the same time. 
ii. The word "obscene" functions very much like the words 
"shocking," and "disgusting," either as a standard aptness word, 
nonstandardly as a purely predictive word or as a purely endorsing 
(gerundive) word without predictive function, or, in some con-
texts, as a descriptive conventional label. When applied to some 
object X in the sense of a standard aptness word, it asserts that X 
would disgust, shock, or repel the average person; it implies (sub-
ject to explicit withdrawal) that it so offends the speaker; and it 
endorses disgust, shock, or repugnance as the correct or appropriate 
reaction to X. 
iii. Common to its usage as a standard aptness word and a 
gerundive word is its employment to endorse the appropriateness 
of offense. It may be impossible conclusively to support such judg-
ments of appropriateness with reasons, but considerations can often 
be presented that have the effect of inducing others-"relevantly"-
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to share one's feelings, and thereby come to appreciate their appro-
priateness. 
iv. The main feature that distinguishes obscene things from 
other repellant or offensive things is their blatancy: their massive 
obtrusiveness, their extreme and unvarnished bluntness, their 
brazenly naked exhibition. A subtly hinted offensiveness is not 
obscene; a devious and concealed immorality is not obscene; a 
veiled suggestiveness is not obscene. A gradual and graceful dis-
garbing by a lovely and skilled strip-teaser is erotically alluring, 
but the immediate appearance on the stage of an unlovely nude 
person for whom the audience has not been prepared is apt to 
seem, for its stark blatancy, obscene. And even for the most lasciv-
ious in the audience, wide screen projections of highly magnified, 
close-up, color slides of sex organs, will at the very least be off-
putting. 
v. There are three classes of objects that can be called "ob-
scene": obscene natural objects, obscene persons and their actions, 
and obscene created things. The basic conceptual distinction is 
between the natural objects, whose obscenity is associated with their 
capacity to evoke disgust (the yuk response} and the others, whose 
obscenity is a function of their vulgarity. Obscene natural objects 
are those which are apt to trigger the yuk reaction. In our culture, 
at least, these are usually slimy, sticky, gelatinous things; excretal 
wastes, mucous products, pus and snot; pale, cold, lifeless things; 
and strange, unnatural, inhuman things. Obscene persons and 
actions are those which are coarse and vulgar to an extreme, or 
those which are brazenly obtrusive violations of any standards of 
propriety, including both moral and charientic ones. Ascriptions 
of obscenity to persons or their actions on the grounds of their 
immorality are nevertheless charientic, not moral, judgments. Bla-
tant immoralities are one class of extremely vulgar or unseemly 
behavior. When we condemn them as morally wrong we pronounce 
moral judgment on them: when we condemn them as obscene (for 
having offended or shocked the moral sensibility) we make the most 
extreme kind of charientic judgment. In the latter case, we should 
no doubt be prepared to make an adverse moral judgment as well, 
but we would have to supplement the purely charientic vocabulary 
to do so. 
Obscene created things are blatantly shocking depictions or 
unsubtle descriptions of obscene persons, actions, or objects. Repre-
sentations of disgusting (yuky) objects can themselves be disgusting 
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to the point of obscenity in which case obscenity is an inherent 
characteristic of the representation itself. In other cases, however, 
obscenity is a "transferred epithet" referring indirectly to the vul-
garity of the creator. In neither case is the ascription of obscenity 
to the created object a kind of aesthetic judgmenL 
vi. There are three ways in which objects of any of these kinds 
can be offensive to the point of obscenity: by direct offense to the 
senses (some totally unrecognized object may yet be "obscene to the 
touch"); by offense to lower order sensibilities (an object recognized 
as a dank cavernous fungus or a slug or a dead body); or by offense 
to higher sensibilities. The latter category includes blatant exhibi-
tion of tabooed conduct (eating pork), of inappropriate responses 
(lewdly reveling in death), or revolting violations of ideals or 
principles (bloated profits, cynical irresponsibility). The corrup-
tion, perversion, depersonalizing, or mere "parodying" of a hu-
man being is likely to strike any observer as obscene in this third 
way;t5 as are the most amazingly obvious immoralities, done in crass 
disregard of ethical principles. The deliberate telling of a gross 
and unvarnished falsehood clearly for the purpose of deceiving 
others and helping the speaker gain at their expense is an "obscene 
lie," which will rightly shock the moral sensibility of a standard 
observer. 
vii. Prominent among the types of conduct that shock higher 
order sensibilities are instances of inappropriate response to the 
behavior of others. There is a kind of second order morality of 
response which is especially susceptible to obscene violation. Rau-
cous laughter at the misfortunes of others, for example, is obscene 
even when the misfortunes are deserved. Even passive witness to 
the intimately private conduct of others, when it is voluntary and 
avoidable, is obscene. Public hangings before huge crowds are 
obscene spectacles even when the crowd is appropriately solemn, 
insofar as they are intrusions upon privacy and violations of per-
sonal dignity. When the crowd is boisterous and lustful for blood, 
the spectacle is doubly obscene, as both intrusive and inappropri-
ately responsive. 
Voyeurism is another clear violation of the morality of re-
sponse. Suppose Mr. and Mrs. A are having sexual intercourse in 
their own room, while unbeknown to them B is peeking through 
the window. There is nothing obscene in what B sees, but the fact 
that he is seeing it is obscene. 1£ a third person C perceives B peek-
ing at the copulating couple, he beholds an obscene spectacle, and 
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will be appalled.40 But if C, on the other hand, lewdly exults at 
what he sees (Mr. and Mrs. A copulating while B lewdly peeks at 
them) then he becomes part of the obscene spectacle himself. But 
a late-arriving third observer D who stumbles on to that obscene 
situation will probably break up in ribald mirth. He is no longer 
dose enough to the primary conduct to be shocked, so derisive 
laughter will be his appropriate reaction to the bizarre chain of 
obscene vulgarities that unfolds before his astonished eye:17 
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tion. I think that is because peculiarly religious offensiveness is thought to be 
"obscene and then some." There is something awesome and frightening about 
it, as if it were to be followed necessarily by the hushed expectation of light· 
ning bolts and cosmic retribution. 
46. Mercier (op. cit. pp. Sl·!J2) cites an O'Connor short story with a plot 
similar to this example. O'Connor's moral, however, is a more fundamental 
one. Mercier writes: " •.• I share the view of the narrator in Frank O'Con· 
nor's story 'The Man of the World.' Having been persuaded by his friend 
Jimmy to spy on a young married couple going to bed next door, he doesn't 
see anything salacious, but as the young wife knelt to pray, he • •••• felt some· 
one else watching us, so that at once we ceased to be the observers and became 
the observed. And the observed in such a humiliating position that nothing 
I could imagine our victims doing would have been so degrading.' " 
47. In the characteristic response of sardonic amusement lies the germ 
of ribald comedy-a form of art not to be confused with obscenity. D is struck 
by the incongruity between the behavior of B and C, on the one hand, and 
standards of propriety that he, and presumably they, would espouse, on the 
other. If he looks at the incongruity from the point of view of the violated 
standards themselves, then his cynical laughter is directed at the foibles of the 
flagrantly transgressive parties. But in comic ribaldry there is always some 
ambivalence, and insofar as D identifies with the violating parties, to that 
extent he is poking fun at the standards. That is what contributes the flavor 
of naughtiness to genuine ribaldry, and (along with the glorying in pure in· 
congruity) distinguishes it from mere scornful derisiveness. 
37 
The E. H. Lindley Memorial Lectureship Fund was established in 1941 in 
memory of Ernest H. Lindley, CJ~a~tccllor of the University of Kansas from 1920 
to 19!19. In Febmary 1941 Mr. Roy Roberu, the dtairman of tlte committee in 
charge, SUSbTCSted in the Gradttale Magazine that 
tlte Chancellor should invite to the University for a lecture or a series 
of lectures, some outstanding national or world figure to speak on 
"'Values of Living"-just a~ the late Chancellor proposed to do in his 
courses "The H uman Situation" and "'Plan for Living." 
In the fo llowing June Mr. Roberts circulated a letter on behal£ o£ the Commit· 
tee, proposing in somewhat broader terms that 
The income from this fund should be spent in a quest of social better· 
mcnt by bringing to the Unh·crsity each year outstanding world leaders 
for a lecture or series of lectures, yet witlt a design so broad in its 
outline tltat in the }ears to come, if it is deemed wise, this living me-
morial could take some more desirable form. 
The fund was allowed to accumulate until 1954, when Professor Ridtard 
McKeon lectured on "Human Rights and International Relations." The next 
lecture was given in 1959 by J>rofessor Everett C. Hughes, and has been pub· 
lished by tlte University of Kansas School of Law as part of his book Sturfents' 
Culture artd Perspectives: Lectures on Medical and General Education. The 
selection of lecturers for the Lindley series bas since been delegated to the 
Department of Philosophy. The following lectures have been published in 
individual pamphlet form and may be obtained from the Department :It a price 
of one dol1:1r and fifty cents e:~ch. 
'1961. "The Idea of :\fan-An Outline oC Philosophic:tl Anthropology." 
By jw(! Ferrater Mora, Professor of Philosophy, Bryn Ma1vr College. 
1962. "Chanll:es in Events and Change• in Things." 
By A. N. Prior, Professor oC Philosophy, University of Manchester. 
' tl965. "Moral Philosophy and the Annlysb of Language." 
By Richard B. Brandt. Professor of Philosophy, Swanhmore College. 
' tl!l64. "Human Freedom and the Self." 
By Roderick M. Cbbhohn, l'rofessor of Philosophy. Brown University. 
tl965. "Freedom oC Mind." 
By Stuan Hampshire, Profe<1or of Philosophy. Princeton University. 
' ti!J66. "Some Beliefs about Jmtlcc." 
By William K. l'rnnkenn, l'ro(eMor of Philosophy. University or Michigan. 
tl!l67. " l•orm and Content in Ethical T heory." 
lly Wil frid Sellars, J'rofcNlr oC l'hilosophy. University or Pittsburgh. 
t i !JGS. "The Sptematic Unity oC Vnluc." 
lly J. N. Findlay, Cl:trk Profe~<or or Philosophy, Vale University. 
1969. "Buller and Bubcrbm-A Crltlc:~l Evaluat ion." 
By Paul Edwards, l'rore<\Or of Philosophy, Brooklyn College of the City Univer· 
sity of Ne"· York. 
1971. "What Aetually Happened." 
By P. R. NoweU.Smith, ProfcS50r oC Philosophy. York Unil•enit)'· 
tl972. "Moral Rationality." 
By Alan Gewirth, Profe<sor of Philosophy. University of Chic:~go. 
tl975. "Rcllections on Evil." 
By Alben Hofstadter, l'rofc~sor of Philowphy, University of Call£orntn, Santa 
Cruz. 
ttl974. "What is DialectiC31?" 
By Paul Riooeur, ProCes.sor oC Philoropby. University of Paris and University 
or Chicago. 
ttl975. "Some Confusions About Subjcctivit)'·" 
By R. M. Hare, White's Profcuor oC Moral Philosophy at Oxford University 
and Fellow of Corpus Chrini College. 
1976. "Self·Dclense and Rights." 
By Judith J arvis Thom$0n, ProCessor of Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of 
Teclmology. 
1977. "What Is Humanism?" 
Bl Georg Henrik von Wright, Research ProCessor of Philosophy, T he Ac:~dcmy 
o Finland. 
1978. "i\foral Relativism." 
By Philippa Foot, Senior Research Fellow, Somerv!lle College, OxCord; and 
Professor oC Pbil~phy. Unhersity oC California, Lo5 Angeles. 
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